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1. Introduction 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU adopted a new 
function in its system: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR), of 
which the first incumbent is Ashton. This new function bridging three former 
jobs - the High Representative for CFSP, the Relex Commissioner and the 
presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) - follows a dual objective of 
coherence and continuity. Coherence, on the one hand because the HR bridges 
the Council and the Commission. Continuity, on the other hand because, at the 
internal level the HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and at the external 
level she represents the EU on the international stage for foreign Affairs. 
Being the voice and the face of the EU for CFSP, Ashton is in charge of the 
political dialogue with third parties. As the first trading partner of the EU and 
as re-emerging power, China has caught our attention. Although the relation 
between the EU and China seems to be driven by a trading agenda, this paper 
aims at investigating the political relation between China and the HR. In this 
regard, the aim of this research is to assess Ashton’s style towards China by 
applying an approach from the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).  
In regard to our main objective, this contribution is structured as follow. First, 
the theoretical approach from FPA is presented. Second, the relation between 
the HR and China is developed in three sections: China in the HR’s agenda 
concerning the strategic partnerships of the EU, the HR’s summit diplomacy 
with China and then the HR’s declaratory diplomacy towards China. Third, a 
summary of the relation highlights the mains tendencies. Fourth and final, an 
assessment of the policy making style of Ashton towards China is completed. 
Our research relates only to the bilateral relation between the HR and China 
between January 2010 and January 2014. Consequently, the relation in 
multilateral frameworks such as the UN, the E3 + 3 talks with Iran, the G8, etc 
are not covered. 
2. Theorical framework 
In order to evaluate the HR-China relation, we decide to use an approach from 
the decision-making in the Foreign Policy Analysis. This approach aims to 
explain the outcome of the foreign policy process. 
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Although combining FPA and the EU might seem troublesome, due mainly to 
the state centricity of FPA, Brian White had demonstrated the adaptability of 
FPA to the European Foreign Policy(White 2001) and some scholars followed 
his call(Larsen 2009, Jørgensen 2013). Moreover, following the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, a step further can be made. A FPA decision-making 
study can be applied to the EU. Although this analysis is mainly applied in the 
study of the US presidents, the Lisbon Treaty provides now the EU with 
presidentiable functions such as the HR. Indeed, the HR is the voice and the 
face of the European Foreign Policy, owns the right of initiative and is backed 
by a diplomatic service. Nevertheless, this adaptability is not fully suitable 
because of the particular status of the European Foreign Policy and its still 
fragmented nature.  
As a result of this, we decide to evaluate the policy-making style of the HR 
concerning China tough the approach of Barber. Indeed, we do not study one 
decision per se. The empirics do not provide such a major decision or crisis 
decision to be studied such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 or the free Iraq 
operation in 2003. We rather focus on the HR’s policy towards China.  
According to Barber, the decision-making, then policy-making, style is defined 
by two axes: the passive-active one and the positive-negative one(Barber 1978). 
The first axis analyses the energy that the incumbent put into his job. In our 
case, as we study specifically the HR-China relationship and not the full 
mandate of Ashton, we analyze the priority of the case for the incumbent. The 
second axis analyses the way the incumbent enjoys his work. However, in the 
absence of data about the psychological profile of Ashton, we decide to 
evaluate the positive-negative axis according to the originality and the diversity 
of the incumbent’s actions for the selected case. 
Therefore, four decision making style towards a policy are available: Passive-
Positive, Passive-Negative, Active-Positive and Active-Negative. The latter 
corresponds to a high engagement towards the policy coupled with new 
impetus and variety of actions. The Active-Negative style also corresponds to a 
high engagement of the incumbent, but the engagement is mainly driven by 
routine. The modality of actions and the suggestions are rather limited. On the 
contrary, the Passive-Active style is characterized by a low involvement of the 
incumbent but despite this low priority the input is rather high as the different 
diplomatic actions. Finally, the Passive-Negative style depicts an incumbent 
who shows low interests in the studied policy and relies on routine. 
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In order to facilitate the assessment of the style, we add variables that frame 
the style of the incumbent. Influenced by Rosenau (Barrea 1978, 38-39), we 
pick three variables: the role one, the governmental one and the societal one. 
The first variable affects the position of the incumbent in the decision making. 
Indeed, the function determines the scope of possibilities of the incumbent. 
The governmental variable relates to the institutional balance of power and its 
interactions. The last variable concerns the influence of external groups such as 
public opinion, medias, lobbies and other interests groups. The determining of 
these variables highlights the trends leading to the assessment of the decision-
making style. 
3. The HR-China Relationship 
3.1. China at the HR’s agenda 
After taking office, Ashton announced three priorities for her mandate: the 
setting-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) which was 
inaugurated in January 2011, the South and East neighbourhood of the EU, 
particularly the Kosovo and the Iranian cases, and finally the strategic 
partnerships of the EU(Ashton 2010). By prioritizing the strategic 
partnerships, Ashton dusts a forgotten concept since the European Security 
Strategy in 2003 and its revision in 2008. Indeed, the strategic partnership is a 
conceptual fog(Renard 2010). There is neither official definition nor an official 
list of them, except the European Security Strategy which mentions the USA, 
Canada, Japan, India, Russia and China. 
In fact, Ashton’s decision is a response to H. Van Rompuy’s call on the 
rethinking of the strategic partnerships. Indeed, in January 2010, following a 
speech prioritizing the strategic partnerships(Van Rompuy 2010), H. Van 
Rompuy called an extraordinary European Council dedicated on the strategic 
partnerships for September 2010. This unanticipated call brought about some 
teeth -grinding among the EU diplomats. Few seemed to be prepared and a 
loose agenda for the meeting coupled to a very fuzzy topic tuned out to be a 
perfect recipe for chaotic preparation, as some diplomats complained. In order 
to solve this lack of preparation, two measures were taken: a Gymnich meeting
i
 
under Ashton’s chairmanship was scheduled to get the thinking ready on one 
hand and on the other hand the foreign affairs ministers attending the 
Gymnich would also participate to the European Council(Renard 2011, 14). 
During the Gymnich meeting (10-11 September 2010), the agenda was mainly 
occupied by the strategic partnership with China. Moreover, Ashton 
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encouraged her colleagues to adopt a comprehensive approach towards this 
country. In this regard, she invited the European commissioners for Economic 
and Monetary Affairs O. Rehn, for Trade K. De Gucht and for Climate C. 
Hedegaard to join the debate. The meeting leaded to a twofold consensus: the 
EU may become a strategic actor only if the Member States acts in concert and 
a strategic thinking about the partners of the EU is vital(Renard 2011, 14). 
During the extraordinary European Council on 16 September 2010, Ashton 
presented to the heads of State and Government a list of nine strategic 
partners, namely the USA, Russia, China, India, Japan, Canada, Brazil, South-
Africa and Mexico. Then, she proposed to add six new : Egypt, Israel, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, South-Korea and Ukraine(Rettman 2010a). The talks were 
mainly focused on the coordination mechanisms between the EU and its 
Member States but also between the EU institutions in order to increase the 
coherence of the EU external action and to adopt a comprehensive approach 
towards the strategic partners(Renard 2011, 15). This debate led to an annex of 
the Conclusions called “Internal arrangements to improve the European 
Union’s External Policy”. Acknowledging the importance and the necessity of 
rethinking the strategic partnerships, the heads of State and Government 
invited the HR to evaluate relations with the strategic partners and to define 
the interests of the EU and the available means to pursue these 
interests(European Council 2010b). 
On the basis of this invitation, the HR drew up a report concerning her 
strategic thinking. After presenting her draft to the FAC on 10 December 
2010, she presented it at the European Council of 16-17 December 2010. Her 
presentation was twofold. First, Ashton introduced some preliminary elements 
about the strategic thinking which can be summarized as follow : primo, the 
need to follow a differentiated approach vis-à-vis each partner; secundo, the 
necessity to bind the CFSP and the EU sectorial policies; tertio, the increasing 
importance of reinforcing the cooperation with strategic partners in 
international fora; quarto, the need to ensure an optimal division of 
responsibilities inside the EU in order to have not a single voice but a common 
message with 27 voices; quinto, the requirement to fix strategic priorities at the 
EU highest level. She also called for creativity, for loosing heavy procedures 
and for focusing on the objectives of the EU during bilateral summits with the 
strategic partners(Bulletin Quotidien Europe 2010b). 
Second, the HR submitted three working papers concerning the USA, Russia 
and China. According to Ashton, the EU-China relationship is crucial for the 
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stability, the security and the economic growth of Europe but is still short of 
its potential. If the EU wants to transform this relationship into a strategic 
partnership, it is needed to be done on the basis of mutual interests and 
benefits. The interests of the EU must be clearly formulated: more trade, more 
investment, a better cooperation on global issues and security concerns, 
lowering the greenhouse gas and promoting democratic governance, state of 
law and human rights. With her report, Ashton clearly adopted a 
comprehensive approach towards China(Bulletin Quotidien Europe 2010c). 
Moreover, she tacked on a pragmatic attitude. Indeed, according to her, the 
EU must not delude itself on the state of law and human rights in China. In its 
development, China clearly prioritizes the economic growth. So, it seems 
obvious that China will not respect the EU norms in the near future. That is 
why the EU priority must be the enforcement of the UN conventions on 
human rights, good governance and the state of law(Bulletin Quotidien Europe 
2010c). 
Besides, the HR also proposed to develop in the 10 to 15 following years a 
strategic partnership with China, but also a climate of trust and a strategic 
interdependence in order to overcome the actual irritations and concerns. Those 
concerns are frankly identified by Ashton. On the EU side, it is the access to 
the Chinese market, the investment, the protection of intellectual property, the 
human rights and the state of law. On the Chinese side, it is the market 
economy status, the Taiwan issue, the Tibet one and the arms 
embargo(Bulletin Quotidien Europe 2010c). In this regard, following the 
proposed pragmatic approach, the HR suggested in vain to lift the arms 
embargo setting up in 1989 following the crackdown of Tian an men 
square(Rettman 2010c). By raising this issue, Ashton tried to cease humiliating 
China with an embargo more symbolic than effective, but relegating Beijing 
with pariah states such as Zimbabwe, Burma or Syria. Following her 
predecessor J. Solana who said “We don’t want to deal with China with 
sanctions, we want to deal with China as a country in the international 
community”(Austin 2005, 10), the HR’s initiative acknowledges that being 
under sanctions is incompatible with integration in the international order. 
Unfortunately for Ashton her proposition achieved similar results to those 
during the EU-China honeymoon in 2003-2005 or during the Spanish 
proposition in January 2010(Godement 2010). Indeed, the end of this embargo 
contains a symbolic baggage that goes beyond the practical effect of the actual 
lifting and the European context (De Wilde d'Estmael 2012, Vennesson 2007). 
Ashton’s proposal probably irritated the USA and certainly Japan(Willis 2010). 
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At the end of the European Council, the heads of State and Government 
saluted the HR’s report. They invited her to follow her strategic thinking, 
accordingly to the conclusions of the September European council, by defining 
the EU interests and the means of the EU in consultation with the 
Commission and the FAC(European Council 2010a). However, to our 
knowledge, the thinking about strategic partnerships has not got any update or 
such important follow-up. Indeed, the euro-crisis hijacked the agenda of the 
European Council regarding CFSP. 
4. The Summit diplomacy 
Representing the EU for foreign Affairs, Ashton is in charge of leading the 
strategic dialogue with China. In four years, she met nine times the Chinese 
representatives and went five times in China
ii
. In relation to other strategic 
partners, the HR went for bilateral or multilateral meeting 19 times in the USA, 
six times in Russia, three times in India, three times in Japan, once in South-
Africa and once in Brazil. These meetings took place within three frameworks: 
the High Level Strategic Dialogue, the visits to the Chinese leadership and 
vice-versa in Brussels and finally the meetings in the shadow of the 
Commission. 
4.1. The high level Strategic Dialogue 
The main framework of the EU-China political relationship is the High Level 
Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2005, the Strategic Dialogue brought 
together the EU rotating presidency and the Chinese vice-minister for foreign 
Affairs. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, both sides decided 
to upgrade it to the highest level in a meeting between the HR and the Chinese 
State Councilor. During the studied period, four sessions took place, 
respectively in September 2010, May 2011, July 2012 and in January 2014. 
The first session took place in China. Despite some EU MP’s criticisms for not 
attending a Quartet meeting for the Middle-East Peace Process, Ashton 
maintained her decision to attend the Strategic Dialogue(Rettman 2010b). She 
went for one week in China, visiting the Universal Exposition in Shanghai and 
particularly the EU pavilion, where she met the Spanish rotating presidency of 
the EU, also visiting China. After sightseeing, the Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo met her in Guiyang, the head city of the Guizhou province. During 
the meeting, both sides tackled the possibility of increasing the bilateral 
cooperation in issues such as the Iranian nuclear issue, Africa, piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden and the situation in the Korean peninsula. However, despite this 
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declaration of principle, neither an agreement nor a joint statement were 
published. It should be stressed that the decision to hold a meeting in one of 
the poorest province of China is not benign. Indeed, it can be interpreted as a 
twofold strategy: on the one hand binding the meeting with the Chinese Go 
West Policy aiming to develop China’s mainland and not only its costal part 
and one the other hand fitting into a reassuring move for the international 
partners. By showing its economic contrasts, China insists on its developing 
status which political ambitions are not revisionist.       
In 2011, Hungary holding the EU presidency and consequently holding some 
EU meetings in its land, the second session took place in the city of Gödöllö, 
near Budapest. While no joint statement was made, the HR declared that both 
she and Dai Bingguo tackled the situation in their respective neighbourhoods. 
Ashton also presented the position of the EU on Human Rights in China. 
Besides, they looked at the opportunities of improving the bilateral 
cooperation between the EU 2020 Strategy and the Chinese 12th five-year plan 
(2011-2015), in areas such a green growth, low carbon economy and 
sustainable urbanization. They also raised a project for cybersecurity 
cooperation.  
In July 2012, the HR went to China while doing a political tour in Asia. She 
first went in Bejiing for the Strategic Dialogue then attended some bilateral 
meetings in Hong-Kong. During these latters, she met the Chinese minister of 
Defense with whom she stressed the bilateral cooperation in the fight against 
piracy. They also agreed on training exchange of military personnel and on the 
holding of a High Level Seminar on Defense and Security in 2013
iii
. She also 
met the Chinese foreign minister. Finally, Ashton met her Chinese counterpart 
for the third session of the Strategic Dialogue. Contrary to the other sessions, 
they released a joint communiqué. Greeting the positive input of the strategic 
dialogue on the EU-China trust climate, both sides committed to increase the 
cooperation, particularly on international issues and on the fight against piracy. 
Taking into account their interdependence and their common interests in the 
actual changing world, China reaffirmed its support for European integration, 
the solving of the debt crisis and the euro zone stability while the HR bore out 
its care about the pacific development of China, the respect of China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, they faced up to deal with their 
differences and mutual concerns in a constructive way. This joint statement 
highlights mutual concessions. Indeed, contrary to her custom, the HR refrains 
from mentioning Human Rights which provoked the ire of some 
NGO’s(EUobserver 2012). On the other hand, China did not mention its 
   
            
 
Chaire InBev Baillet – Latour Programme « Union européenne – Chine » 
 
 
 
The High Representative and China 
 
 
10 
twofold regular claims: the lifting of the embargo and its market economy 
status. According to an EU diplomat, concessions in statements allow more 
criticism behind closed doors(Rettman 2012a). Indeed, in her own statement, 
Ashton affirmed proceeding to an exchange of views on issues such as human 
rights but also urbanization, trade, investment and the E3+3 talks.  
The fourth session was hold in January 2014 in Brussels between the HR 
and the new State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who she had already met when he 
was foreign minister. During the meeting, both sides mostly focused on the 
implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. 
This report adopted during the 16
th
 EU-China summit in November 2013, 
aims to improve the EU-China cooperation by enjoying the synergies 
allowed by both sides’ strategies: on the one hand the EU 2020 Strategy and 
on the other hand the 12
th
 five-year plan coupled with the Chinese two 
centenary goals. Besides, the topics concerning foreign Affairs, security and 
Defense represented 14% of the document, which is an improvement in 
relation to the custom statements of the previous EU-China Summits. 
Finally, the HR thanked China’s support during the E3+3 talks with Iran. 
4.2. Visiting the Chinese leadership and vice-versa 
In October 2011, the HR went to Beijing in order to meet the Chinese 
leadership. Her stay was articulated in three parts. First, Ashton held a meeting 
with the Minister of Defense. They both worked on the improvement of 
Defense and in crisis response bilateral cooperation, particularly in the fight 
against piracy. In this regard, the escort of ships in the Gulf of Aden and off 
the Somalian Coast has become the paragon of UE-China cooperation. 
Indeed, they followed a fruitful work since the first international escort mission 
in 2008. Besides, they also talked about the situation in the South China Sea 
and the necessity of resolving the territorial disputes trough diplomacy. The 
Minister of Defense also presented the Chinese Withe Paper on Defense.  
Second, the HR was invited by the State Councilor to a meeting where she 
informed of the latest development in the euro zone and of the preparation of 
the next G20. Third, she met the Foreign Minister with whom she dealt with 
international issues such as the crisis in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan as well as 
the situation in Iran and Syria. During all of her stay, the HR emphasized the 
EU position on human rights. 
At the invitation of the new Chinese Foreign Minister, Ashton went to China 
in order to meet the new Chinese leaders. She firstly met the Chinese Minister 
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of Defense with whom she talked over anti-piracy fight and training exchange 
of military personnel. Then, she was received by the new FM who with she 
took up challenges such as urbanization, rural economic development and 
green growth. Finally, a meeting was hold with the previous FM, now State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi. The debate focused on the Chinese support on the 
E3+3 talks, their common concerns about the situation in North-Korea, the 
clashes in South Chinese Sea and the situation in the European neighborhood, 
notably in Syria. According to the HR’s communiqué, the human rights 
seemed not to have been approached. 
As Ashton visited China twice to meet the Chinese leadership, her counterpart 
went also in Brussels at the beginning of his mandate. Indeed, in October 2010 
the State Councilor Ma Kai
iv
 held an understated meeting with Ashton. As 
Ashton was at that time planning a rethinking of the strategic partnerships, the 
talks probably focused on the strategic partnership and on the lifting of the 
embargo, one of China’s custom claim. 
4.3. In the shadow of the Commission 
Beside her own meetings with the Chinese leadership, C.Ashton also 
participated in two wider meetings. In those latter, acting as vice-president of 
the Commission, she accompanied J. M. Barroso, the president of the 
European Commission. In her first visit in China as HR, Ashton was a 
member of the EU delegation headed by J. M. Barroso in April 2010. The aim 
of this visit was to introduce the new Commission to the Chinese leadership 
and to prepare an estimated agenda for the bilateral relation in the new 
framework of the Lisbon Treaty. The delegation first went to Beijing to meet 
the Chinese executive in a meeting where each commissioner met his 
counterpart. Then, the delegation went to Shanghai to assist the opening 
ceremony of the Universal Exposition 2010 and of the EU pavilion. During 
this trip, Ashton’s presence was understated although she seemed to be 
prepared
v
. The focus was on the president of the Commission and on 
economic, trade, financial and climatic issues. It ought to be pointed out that 
the political climate contrasted with the Olympics opening ceremony in 2008 
when the EU-China relationship reached its nadir.  
In September 2012, contrary to the previous (and following) summits, Ashton 
attended the EU-China summit
vi
. The custom absence of the HR may be 
explained by the focus on economic and trade issue. Indeed, as Holslag points 
out, the EU-China summits between 2002 and 2007 are dominated by those 
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issues and the summits after Lisbon did not reverse the trend(Holslag 2011, 
296). Confirming the HR’s exceptional participation, the communiqué pointed 
out that the HR assisted the president of the Commission who represented, 
alongside with the European Council president the EU. Ashton’s presence 
seems to increase the share of talks concerning foreign Affairs issues. Among 
these latter, we find the disarmament, the non-proliferation of WMP, the 
Iranian and North-Korean cases, Afghanistan, Burma, Sudan and South-Sudan 
and the situation in the respective neighborhood of China and the EU. 
5. The declaratory diplomacy  
Although the concept of declaratory diplomacy is perceived as negative and in 
opposition to an operational diplomacy, the impact and the objectives of this 
diplomacy should not be neglected for several reasons. First, statements and 
declarations are part of the HR’s available tools and fall within the EU 
diplomacy previous to Lisbon(Voncina 2011). They allow her to be heard on 
the international stage and to increase the visibility of the EU. Second, as T. de 
Wilde points out, the declaratory diplomacy is the first visible result of the 
CFSP Laboratory: a silence, an omission indicates a dead end, even a failure in 
the consensus building(De Wilde d'Estmael 2011, 62). Third, statements and 
declarations hold a triple objective: a primary one vis-à-vis the target, a 
secondary one regarding the EU and a tertiary related to a third party or the 
international community. Indeed a low or even quasi inexistent impact on the 
primary objective must not hide the two others. 
In order to express her opinion on the international stage, the HR has at her 
disposal three types of statements: the declarations of the HR in behalf of the 
EU, the statements of the HR and the statements by the spokesperson of the 
HR. While the declarations need to be agreed unanimously by the FAC and 
consequently entails the responsibility of the EU, statements do not need the 
coordination process and allow the HR to react quickly on her own 
responsibility. Regarding statements of the spokespersons, they correspond to 
the HR’s one but are issued by a spokesperson either to manage a scheduling 
conflict or to lower the priority. 
Between January 2010 and January 2014, 30 statements and declarations 
concerning China were issued by the HR. It corresponds to a 2% share of the 
complete statements. Among these 30 statements, five themes arise: Human 
Rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, natural disasters and finally the situation in South 
China Sea and with Japan.  
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 Human 
Rights 
Taiwan Hong-
Kong 
Natural 
disaster 
China-
Japan 
and 
South 
China 
Sea 
Total 
Declaration 
by the HR 
on behalf of 
the EU 
3 - - - 2 5 
Statement by 
the HR 
7 3 1 2 - 13 
Statement by 
the HR’s 
spokesperson 
3 4 3 1 1 12 
Total 13 7 4 3 3 30 
 
With 16 statements, the Human Rights theme is the major focus of the HR’s 
declaratory diplomacy vis-à-vis China. The human Rights label features three 
subtopics: the situation of civil rights defenders, death penalty and Tibet. 
Concerning civil rights defenders, Ashton deeply regretted the arrest or the 
unexplained demise of militants such as the lawyers Xu Zhiyong, Gao 
Zhisheng, Ni Yulan, the writer Tan Zuoren, the artist Ai Wei Wei, Chen Wen, 
Chen Xi and finally the Nobel peace prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. She strongly 
called on their releases. Concerning this latter, Ashton was caught into a 
controversy. Some MP’s, including Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and NGO’s asked the 
HR to represent the EU during the Nobel ceremony, estimating that the EU 
should always be represented by the HR in order to stress the importance of 
peace among the 27 Member States. However, this call was vain. The HR 
justified her choice by her non-invitation to the ceremony and the fact that the 
EU was already represented at the ambassador level. Despite her absence, 
Ashton congratulated the laureate, contrary to the European Council President 
and 14 of the Member States who did not issue any statements(Bulletin 
Quotidien Europe 2010a). In response to the HR’s statements about human 
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rights, the Chinese authority recalled the judiciary sovereignty of China and 
condemned foreign interference(Le Quotidien du peuple en ligne 2011, 2012).  
The second subtopic is Tibet. In December 2012, Ashton reacted to the 
Tibetan self-immolations. While respecting China’s territorial integrity, she 
called upon the Chinese authorities to address the deep-rooted causes of the 
frustration of the Tibetan people and ensure that their civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights are respected and to open Tibet for 
diplomats and international journalists. She also called on Tibetans to refrain 
from resorting to extreme forms of protest and encouraged all parties to 
resume a meaningful dialogue. This declaration followed a Dalai lama’ call to 
Ashton the day before(Rettman 2012b). Besides, six months earlier, in June 
2012, the HR made a speech in front of the European Parliament about the 
situation in Tibet. By including the key elements of her speech, her declaration 
can be considered as its culmination. The fight against death penalty is the 
third subtopic. The HR deeply regrets the execution of inmates. She called on 
the Chinese government to abolish death penalty, in line with the worldwide 
trend. 
The second theme approached by C. Asthon was Taiwan. This issue was 
actually subdivided in 4 parts: the Taiwanese participation in international 
organizations, the China-Taiwan relationship, democracy in Taiwan and death 
penalty. In line with the One China Policy, the EU recognizes the government 
of PRC as the only legitimate government of China and so has neither 
diplomatic nor official political relation with Taiwan. However, the EU 
recognize Taiwan as a trading and economic entity and supports its 
participation in international fora when a state status is not needed. To this 
regard, Ashton congratulated the Taiwanese participation in the 38th session of 
the General Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization which 
encourages dialogue, cooperation and trust climate in the Taiwanese strait. 
Besides, the HR reiterated her support to the Taiwanese participation in 
multilateral organization where its presence is important for European and 
global interests. Concerning the China-Taiwan relations, Ashton welcomed the 
signature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement by both 
parties. The HR also congratulated the elections of January 2014 and reiterated 
the EU support for democratic values. Finally, death penalty is the bone of 
contention between the EU and Taiwan. On four occasions, she regretted the 
execution of inmates and called upon the Taiwanese authorities to restore a de 
facto moratorium on death penalty. However, these calls remained without 
effect. Indeed, a large majority of Taiwanese is still opposed to the abolition, 
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especially as the local lobbies are very active. No Taiwanese leaders dare 
promising the eternal moratorium asked by the EU(Hungdah 2013, 544). 
Hong-Kong appears to be the third theme of the declaratory diplomacy. 
Although Hong-Kong is part of China, we distinguish the statements for a 
twofold reason. On the one hand, considering its particular custom status, the 
EU considers Hong-Kong as a distinctive entity in the framework of the trade 
policy. On the other hand, Hong-Kong distinguishes itself from China 
concerning the state of law and democracy. Indeed, three of the four referred 
statements relate to this latter. The HR supported and congratulated the 
elections held in Hong-Kong for the legislative Council. Alongside the support 
for democracy, Ashton expressed the EU condolences to the families of the 38 
victims of the shipping accident on 1 October 2012. The gravity of the 
accident coupled with the ties uniting Hong-Kong and the UK, of which 
Ashton is citizen, explain this statement. 
Expressing condolences after natural disasters such as the mudslides in August 
2010 and the earthquakes in April 2013 and July 2013 is the fourth theme. It 
can be stressed that two of the three statements took place just before HR-
China meetings: the first session of the strategic dialogue in Augustus 2010 and 
the visit to the Chinese leadership in April 2013. Given the absence of 
statement for other natural disasters in China, it seems that the EU sympathy 
was driven by trust climate building objective before the meetings. 
The fifth and final theme is the situation in South China Sea and the related 
China-Japan relations. Two declarations of HR on behalf of the EU were 
issued to call upon the parties to calm down the situation in South China Sea. 
The first one is related to clashes in September 2012 off the coast of the 
contested Senkaku-Diaoyo islands between a Taiwanese flotilla and the 
Japanese coast-guards. Indeed, the archipelago is claimed by China, Japan and 
Taiwan for economic, strategic and symbolic reasons. Those incompatible 
territorial rivalries lead to regular clashes which contribute to create a China 
Sea powder keg. The second one referred to the establishment in November 
2012 by China of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, including 
i.a. the Senkaku-Diaoyoi islands. Reminding that the legitimate use of sea and 
airspace is a right enshrined in international law and is essential for security, 
stability and prosperity, the HR called on all sides to exercise caution and 
restraint. Finally, in December 2013, the HR regretted the Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine
vii
. According to Ashton, the visit 
was not conducive to lowering tensions in the region or to improving relations 
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with Japan’s neighbours, especially China. However, it seems unlikely that 
Abe’s visit is related to external agenda. According to E. Atanassova-Cornelis, 
the previous Prime Minister’s visits were due to seduce the right wing of their 
own political party. Nevertheless, the absence of official visit since 2006 and 
the clashes in South China Sea the previous month may invalidate this 
theory(Atanassova-Cornelis 2012, 202). 
As pointed out, the declaratory diplomacy follows a triple objective. This 
triple analysis is an adaptation of Barber’s model establishing a triple 
distinction for the international sanction(Barber 1979) and then recomposed 
and adapted to the European Union by T. de Wilde(de Wilde d'Estmael 
2004).  Indeed, as sanctions, statements have three objectives. The first 
objective concerns the target: punish it rhetorically or induce changes. The 
second one focuses on the sender: the latter want to demonstrate a capacity 
to express its opinion, at least to say something and to move from silence to 
the words in order to appease the public opinion or to response to certain 
internal demands from i.a. the European Parliament. Last but not least the 
third objective is related to a third party or to the international community. 
The sender wants to remind erga omnes the principles driving the external 
action of the European Union, its objectives and his coherence but also to 
support the action of third parties or arouse their supports. 
In order to lighten the application of this model, we propose to develop it on 
a chart regrouping studied statements and declarations in nine topics: 
Human Rights’ militants, death penalty (both in Taiwan and in China), the 
democratic process (both in Hong-Kong and in Taiwan), natural disasters 
and accidents. These first four topics regroup similar statements. The final 
five are analyzed individually: the clashes in the South China Sea, the 
Chinese identification zone, the Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, the 
participation of Taiwan in AICAO and finally the agreement between 
Taiwan and China. 
Topics Primary objective 
Secondary 
objective 
Tertiary objective 
Human rights 
militants 
Condemning the 
situation of 
human rights in 
China 
Answering to 
the demands 
from the 
European 
Parliament, 
Reminding the EU 
principles on 
human rights and 
their universality 
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Encouraging the 
liberation of the 
jailed militants 
NGO’s and the 
public opinion 
Death penalty 
Marking 
disagreement 
concerning the 
death penalty 
Urging for 
abolition 
Answering the 
demands from 
the European 
Parliament, 
NGO’s and the 
public opinion 
Reminding the EU 
principles on 
human rights and 
their universality 
Democratic 
process 
Encouraging the 
development of 
democracy 
Answering the 
demands from 
the European 
Parliament, 
NGO’s and the 
public opinion 
Reminding China 
and others States 
the EU 
engagement for 
democracy 
Disasters and 
accidents 
Sharing the grief 
of the target to 
maintain good 
relations 
Say something 
Demonstrating the 
global power of 
the EU, concerned 
all over the world 
Clashes in South 
China Sea 
Calling for calm 
the parties 
Say something 
Demonstrate the 
global power of 
the EU 
Reminding the EU 
principles for 
international law 
and diplomatic 
crisis resolution 
Chinese 
identification 
zone 
Condemning the 
Chinese decision 
Calling for calm 
the parties 
Say something 
Demonstrate the 
global power of 
the EU 
Reminding the EU 
principles for 
international law 
and diplomatic 
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crisis resolution 
Abe’s visit to 
Yasukuni 
Condemning the 
Japanese decision 
Say something 
Calling for calm 
and avoiding 
escalation 
Taiwan in 
AICAO 
Encouraging 
Taiwan in its 
international 
claims 
Answering to 
the pro-Taiwan 
demands 
Distinguishing 
lightly from the 
one China policy 
Agreement 
between China 
and Taiwan 
Felicitate the 
parties in their 
meaningful 
dialogue 
Reminding the 
EU interest in 
the Taiwan Strait 
Reminding the EU 
principles for 
diplomatic conflict 
resolution 
 
This analytical chart highlights the importance of secondary and tertiary 
objectives. Indeed, the statements served as capacity for expression, although 
minimal, of the EU in a twofold aim: internal and external. Internal, because it 
answers the demands of the European institutions, the Member States and the 
public opinion which all claim a taking up of a position on those topics. 
External, because through the statements, the EU remind the principles 
driving its own external action, particularly the focus on Human Rights and the 
diplomatic crisis management. By chastising China, the EU reminds all States 
about the universal application, from the smallest to the biggest State, of EU 
norms. As a matter of fact, by pursuing the secondary and tertiary objectives, 
the statements are the reflection of the EU acquis communautaire, as Regelsberger 
and Wessels points out(Regelsberger and Wessels 2005, 108). In the statements 
relating to China, it mostly concerns Human Rights and democracy. 
6. Summary of the HR-China relationship 
The review of the HR-China relationship arouses three remarks. First, 
according to her announcement, Ashton made the strategic partnership with 
China a priority. In response to the invitation of the European Council, she 
started a strategic thinking on the UE-China strategic partnership. In this 
regard, she involved both the FAC and the commissioners in order to adopt a 
comprehensive approach. Several meetings with the Chinese leadership in 2010 
also allowed her to grasp the UE-China relationship. This strategic thinking 
   
            
 
Chaire InBev Baillet – Latour Programme « Union européenne – Chine » 
 
 
 
The High Representative and China 
 
 
19 
leaded to a report submitted to the European Council. However, in the 
absence of political will of the Member States, in particular in the lifting of the 
embargo and due to the (voluntary?) conceptual fog of the strategic 
partnership, the HR’s strategic thinking is still unresolved, a fortiori its 
implementation. Besides, beyond the strategic thinking, China remained on the 
HR’s agenda: she participated in nine UE-China bilateral meetings, including 
five visits in China, which is lower than the USA but higher than the others 
emerging powers. 
Second, the HR established contact with the Chinese leadership. Following the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Strategic Dialogue was upgraded to the highest level. In this 
framework, Ashton built a special relationship with the State Councilor Bai 
Bingguo, then with Yang Jiechi, who she knew as FM. The regular meeting 
framework contributes to the development of an infrastructure of contact 
between the EU and China. 
Third, despite the multiplication of the contacts, the talks between the parties 
remained empty. Trade and economic issues dominate. One the one hand, this 
economic focus arouses an institutional conundrum. In theory, the HR is 
responsible for CFSP, not for trade, although she coordinates the external 
action of the EU. But this coordination process is still not clear, because no 
hierarchical link exists between the HR and the trade commissioner
viii
. In fact, 
such a link would call into question the collegiality of the Commission. On the 
other hand, this economic focus demonstrates the emptiness of the political 
relationship. Both parties consult themselves but do not generally coordinate 
their foreign policies. On the contrary, the anti-piracy cooperation seems to be 
considered as the paragon of the EU-China cooperation even though it defies 
the HR’s approach. Indeed, Ashton follows a top-down approach while the 
cooperation against piracy is bottom-up (Barton 2013). Otherwise, the 
situation of the human rights in China is still the bone of contention. Most of 
the statements are related to this theme and it comes into the bilateral 
meetings. However, this focus on human rights remains mainly without effect 
on China. The declaratory diplomacy pursued more an objective for the EU 
itself, its public opinion, its institutions but also for the international 
community. The EU reminds the principles driving its external action and 
enforcers its normative power. 
In conclusion, during four years, the HR managed to build a framework for 
dialogue and discussion with China, as a prelude to a trust-based relationship. 
However due to divergences among Member states, notably on the embargo 
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and due to divergences between China and the EU, particularly on the Human 
Rights, the HR’s diplomacy vis-à-vis China remains almost sterile. 
7. Conclusion: assessment of the HR’s style 
On the base of the presentation of the HR-China relationship, we propose to 
assess Ashton’s policy making style towards China. In this respect, we first 
develop the three variables framing the policy: the role one, the governmental 
one and the societal one and then we assess the policy making style using 
Barber’s approach. 
Applied to our case, the variables are the following ones. The function of HR 
matches the role variables. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the HR represents 
the EU for matters related to the CFSP and conducts political dialogues with 
third party. Besides, the HR drives the CFSP and contributes trough his 
propositions to the elaboration and the implementation of this policy. The HR 
is also in charge of the coherence of the external action of the EU. 
However, the ambition of this role is tempered by the governmental variable. 
Indeed, CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy, so in the hands of the 
Member States. The HR’s diplomatic initiative is thus limited. Even more, the 
HR is in competition with the president of the European Council and the 
president of the Commission. This lack of discretion is a trend in our case. 
Despite her propositions, Ashton is still reliant on the political will of the 
Member States on the one hand and on the other hand she remains in the 
shadow of the two presidents. For example, the strategic thinking on strategic 
partnership was initiated by Van Rompuy’s call and during the great UE-China 
meetings the HR was barely invited to join the two presidents. Nonetheless, 
this absence of political will from the Member States is a major trend of 
Ashton’s mandate(Helwig 2013). 
Regarding the societal variable, the influence of the European parliament and 
of some NGO’s concerning the human rights must be highlighted. Indeed, 
several HR’s statements answer to demands from the European parliament and 
the civil society, particularly relating to Tibet and Chinese dissidents. However, 
this influence is limited to the HR’s declaratory diplomacy and does not steer 
against the current European policy towards Human Rights. 
The determination of these variables allows to highlight the trends of the HR’s 
policy towards China, as a prelude of the application of Barber’s approach. In 
this respect, we assess the policy making style of the HR concerning China as 
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Passive-Positive. Passive, because the Chinese case remains a minor priority for 
Ashton. Indeed, she was more focused on the setting up of the EEAS, on the 
facilitating-dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and on the E3+3 Talks with 
Iran. In terms of visits, meetings, statements or strategic thinking, China is far 
from being a top priority for the HR. Besides, the low priority concerning 
China is also the result of her low available discretion in this case between 
Member States divided concerning China and a trade and economic bilateral 
relation headed by the Barroso-Van Rompuy tandem. However, in spite of her 
low priority towards China, the HR adopted a constructive and various posture 
concerning the EU-China relations. Indeed, her original input on the strategic 
partnership thinking, her regular visits to develop a trust-base relationship with 
the Chinese leadership and her declaratory diplomacy, strong on Human 
Rights but cautious on the international issues, confirms it. 
In conclusion, by adapting an FPA policy making approach to the HR, this 
paper aims to propose a new way of assessing the EU diplomacy following the 
Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, this approach could be extended to the other policies 
of the HR such as the others strategic partners, CSDP or mediations in the 
Kosovo or Iran cases. Nevertheless, the adaptability for crisis such as the Arab 
spring seems more tricky due to the need for quick reactions which is the 
Achill heel of the CFSP. 
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i
 A Gymnich Meeting is an informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council. It is 
named after the first meeting held in the city of Gymnich. 
 
ii
 In chronological order, the meeting are the follow ones : the visit of the 
Commission on the 29 April 2010, the first session of the High Level Strategic 
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Dialogue from 30 Augustus to 4 September 2010, the meeting in Brussels on 30 
October 2010, the second session of the High Level Strategic Dialogue on 12 May 
2011, the visit to the Chinese leadership from 24 to 26 October 2011, the third 
session of the High Level Strategic Dialogue from 9 to 11 July 2012, the EU-China 
Summit on 20 September 2012, the second visit to the Chinese leadership from 25 
to 28 April 2013 and the fourth session of the High Level Strategic Dialogue on 27 
January 2014. 
 
iii
 This Seminar was held on the 19-20-21 March 2013. It reunited defense and 
security experts from respective diplomatic, military and academic establishments 
from the EU and China. The HR did not attend the seminar. 
iv
 The state Councilor Ma Kai is also Secretary General for the State Council and is 
in charge of economic-related issues. 
v
 A few weeks before the Commission’s visit, C. Ashton was seen with the 
following book: Mark Leonard, What Does China Think?, Fourth Estate Ltd, 2008. 
 
vi
 Although this participation is exceptional for the EU-China summit, C. Ashton 
always participates in the others summits: i.a. with Russia, Japan, Canada, India, 
Brazil, and the USA. 
 
vii
 Yasukuny is a sanctuary in Tokyo honoring the memory of 14 war criminals in 
class A in addition to 2,5 million Japanese soldiers. 
 
viii
 Indeed, the HR is in charge of coordinating the works of the Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Development and humanitarian aid. But the Lisbon Treaty does not 
mention the trade Commissioner. However, J. Barroso created a group of 
Commissioners headed by the HR and including the three former commissioners 
plus the trade one and the monetary affairs one. But the practical implementation 
and results of this group is still fuzzy and don’t seem to work. In fact, it might be a 
way for the President of the Commission to check on Ashton’s work and to limit 
her discretion. 
